Protection against omicron (B.1.1.529) BA.2 reinfection conferred by primary omicron BA.1 or pre-omicron SARS-CoV-2 infection among health-care workers with and without mRNA vaccination: a test-negative case-control study.

BACKGROUND: There is a paucity of data on vaccine-induced or infection-induced (hybrid or natural) immunity against omicron (B.1.1.529) subvariant BA.2, particularly in comparing the effects of previous SARS-CoV-2 infection with the same or different genetic lineage. We aimed to estimate the protection against omicron BA.2 associated with previous primary infection with omicron BA.1 or pre-omicron SARS-CoV-2, among health-care workers with and without mRNA vaccination. METHODS: We conducted a test-negative case-control study among health-care workers aged 18 years or older who were tested for SARS-CoV-2 in Quebec, Canada, between March 27 and June 4, 2022, when BA.2 was the predominant variant and was presumptively diagnosed with a positive test result. We identified cases (positive test during study period) and controls (negative test during study period) using the provincial laboratory database that records all nucleic acid amplification testing for SARS-CoV-2 in Quebec, and used the provincial immunisation registry to determine vaccination status. Logistic regression models compared the likelihood of BA.2 infection or reinfection (second positive test ≥30 days after primary infection) among health-care workers who had previous primary infection and none to three mRNA vaccine doses versus unvaccinated health-care workers with no primary infection. FINDINGS: 258 007 SARS-CoV-2 tests were done during the study period. Among those with a valid result and that met the inclusion criteria, there were 37 732 presumed BA.2 cases (2521 [6·7%] reinfections following pre-omicron primary infection and 659 [1·7%] reinfections following BA.1 primary infection) and 73 507 controls (7360 [10·0%] had pre-omicron primary infection and 12 315 [16·8%] had BA.1 primary infection). Pre-omicron primary infection was associated with a 38% (95% CI 19-53) reduction in BA.2 infection risk, with higher BA.2 protection among those who had also received one (56%, 95% CI 47-63), two (69%, 64-73), or three (70%, 66-74) mRNA vaccine doses. Omicron BA.1 primary infection was associated with greater protection against BA.2 infection (risk reduction of 72%, 95% CI 65-78), and protection was increased further among those who had received two doses of mRNA vaccine (96%, 95-96), but was not improved with a third dose (96%, 95-97). INTERPRETATION: Health-care workers who had received two doses of mRNA vaccine and had previous BA.1 infection were subsequently well protected for a prolonged period against BA.2 reinfection, with a third vaccine dose conferring no improvement to that hybrid protection. If this protection also pertains to future variants, there might be limited benefit from additional vaccine doses for people with hybrid immunity, depending on timing and variant. FUNDING: Ministère de la Santé et des Services Sociaux du Québec.

Potential benefit of extended dose schedules of human papillomavirus vaccination in the context of scarce resources and COVID-19 disruptions in low-income and middle-income countries: a mathematical modelling analysis.

BACKGROUND: The WHO Strategic Advisory Group of Experts recommended that an extended interval of 3-5 years between the two doses of the human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine could be considered to alleviate vaccine supply shortages. However, three concerns have limited the introduction of extended schedules: girls could be infected between the two doses, the vaccination coverage for the second dose could be lower at ages 13-14 years than at ages 9-10 years, and identifying girls vaccinated with a first dose to give them the second dose could be difficult. Using mathematical modelling, we examined the potential effect of these concerns on the population-level impact and efficiency of extended dose HPV vaccination schedules. METHODS: We used HPV-ADVISE, an individual-based, transmission-dynamic model of multitype HPV infection and disease, calibrated to country-specific data for four low-income and middle-income countries (India, Viet Nam, Uganda, and Nigeria). For the extended dose scenarios, we varied the vaccination coverage of the second dose among girls previously vaccinated, the one-dose vaccine efficacy, and the one-dose vaccine duration of protection. We also examined a strategy in which girls aged 14 years were vaccinated irrespective of their previous vaccination status. We used a scenario of girls-only two-dose vaccination at age 9 years (vaccine=9 valent, vaccine-type efficacy=100%, duration of protection=lifetime, and coverage=80%) as our comparator. We estimated two outcomes: the relative reduction in the age-standardised cervical cancer incidence (population-level impact) and the number of cervical cancers averted per 100 000 doses (efficiency). FINDINGS: Our model projected substantial reductions in cervical cancer incidence over 100 years with the two-dose schedule (79-86% depending on the country), compared with no vaccination. Projections for the 5-year extended schedule, in which the second dose is given only to girls previously vaccinated at age 9 years, were similar to the current two-dose schedule, unless vaccination coverage of the second dose is very low (reductions in cervical cancer incidence of 71-78% assuming 30% coverage at age 14 years among girls vaccinated at age 9 years). However, when the dose at age 14 years is given to girls irrespective of vaccination status and assuming high vaccination coverage, the model projected a substantially greater reduction in cervical cancer incidence compared with the current two-dose schedule (reductions in cervical cancer incidence of 86-93% assuming 70% coverage at age 14 years, irrespective of vaccination status). Efficiency of the extended schedule was greater than the two-dose schedule, even with a drop in vaccination coverage. INTERPRETATION: The three concerns are unlikely to have a substantial effect on the population-level impact of extended dose schedules. Hence, extended dose schedules will likely provide similar cervical cancer reductions as two-dose schedules, while reducing the number of doses required in the short-term, providing a more efficient use of scarce resources, and offering a 5-year time window to reassess the necessity of the second dose. FUNDING: WHO, Canadian Institute of Health Research Foundation, Fonds de recherche du Québec-Santé, Digital Research Alliance of Canada, and Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

Estimated Protection of Prior SARS-CoV-2 Infection Against Reinfection With the Omicron Variant Among Messenger RNA-Vaccinated and Nonvaccinated Individuals in Quebec, Canada.

Importance: The Omicron variant is phylogenetically and antigenically distinct from earlier SARS-CoV-2 variants and the original vaccine strain. Protection conferred by prior SARS-CoV-2 infection against Omicron reinfection, with and without vaccination, requires quantification. Objective: To estimate the protection against Omicron reinfection and hospitalization conferred by prior heterologous non-Omicron SARS-CoV-2 infection and/or up to 3 doses of an ancestral, Wuhan-like messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccine. Design, Setting, and Participants: This test-negative, population-based case-control study was conducted between December 26, 2021, and March 12, 2022, and included community-dwelling individuals aged 12 years or older who were tested for SARS-CoV-2 infection in the province of Quebec, Canada. Exposures: Prior laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 infection with or without mRNA vaccination. Main Outcomes and Measures: The main outcome was laboratory-confirmed SARS-CoV-2 reinfection and associated hospitalization, presumed to be associated with the Omicron variant according to genomic surveillance. The odds of prior infection with or without vaccination were compared for case participants with Omicron infection and associated hospitalizations vs test-negative control participants. Estimated protection was derived as 1 - the odds ratio, adjusted for age, sex, testing indication, and epidemiologic week. Analyses were stratified by severity and time since last non-Omicron infection or vaccine dose. Results: This study included 696 439 individuals (224 007 case participants and 472 432 control participants); 62.2% and 63.9% were female and 87.4% and 75.5% were aged 18 to 69 years, respectively. Prior non-Omicron SARS-CoV-2 infection was detected for 9505 case participants (4.2%) and 29 712 control participants (6.3%). Among nonvaccinated individuals, prior non-Omicron infection was associated with a 44% reduction (95% CI, 38%-48%) in Omicron reinfection risk, which decreased from 66% (95% CI, 57%-73%) at 3 to 5 months to 35% (95% CI, 21%-47%) at 9 to 11 months postinfection and was below 30% thereafter. The more severe the prior infection, the greater the risk reduction. Estimated protection (95% CI) against Omicron infection was consistently significantly higher among vaccinated individuals with prior infection compared with vaccinated infection-naive individuals, with 65% (63%-67%) vs 20% (16%-24%) for 1 dose, 68% (67%-70%) vs 42% (41%-44%) for 2 doses, and 83% (81%-84%) vs 73% (72%-73%) for 3 doses. For individuals with prior infection, estimated protection (95% CI) against Omicron-associated hospitalization was 81% (66%-89%) and increased to 86% (77%-99%) with 1, 94% (91%-96%) with 2, and 97% (94%-99%) with 3 mRNA vaccine doses, without signs of waning. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this study suggest that vaccination with 2 or 3 mRNA vaccine doses among individuals with prior heterologous SARS-CoV-2 infection provided the greatest protection against Omicron-associated hospitalization. In the context of program goals to prevent severe outcomes and preserve health care system capacity, a third mRNA vaccine dose may add limited protection in twice-vaccinated individuals with prior SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Two-Dose Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 Vaccine Effectiveness With Mixed Schedules and Extended Dosing Intervals: Test-Negative Design Studies From British Columbia and Quebec, Canada.

BACKGROUND: The Canadian coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) immunization strategy deferred second doses and allowed mixed schedules. We compared 2-dose vaccine effectiveness (VE) by vaccine type (mRNA and/or ChAdOx1), interval between doses, and time since second dose in 2 of Canada's larger provinces. METHODS: Two-dose VE against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infection or hospitalization among adults ≥18 years, including due to Alpha, Gamma, and Delta variants of concern (VOCs), was assessed ≥14 days postvaccination by test-negative design studies separately conducted in British Columbia and Quebec, Canada, between 30 May and 27 November (epi-weeks 22-47) 2021. RESULTS: In both provinces, all homologous or heterologous mRNA and/or ChAdOx1 2-dose schedules were associated with ≥90% reduction in SARS-CoV-2 hospitalization risk for ≥7 months. With slight decline from a peak of >90%, VE against infection was ≥80% for ≥6 months following homologous mRNA vaccination, lower by ∼10% when both doses were ChAdOx1 but comparably high following heterologous ChAdOx1 + mRNA receipt. Findings were similar by age group, sex, and VOC. VE was significantly higher with longer 7-8-week versus manufacturer-specified 3-4-week intervals between mRNA doses. CONCLUSIONS: Two doses of any mRNA and/or ChAdOx1 combination gave substantial and sustained protection against SARS-CoV-2 hospitalization, spanning Delta-dominant circulation. ChAdOx1 VE against infection was improved by heterologous mRNA series completion. A 7-8-week interval between first and second doses improved mRNA VE and may be the optimal schedule outside periods of intense epidemic surge. Findings support interchangeability and extended intervals between SARS-CoV-2 vaccine doses, with potential global implications for low-coverage areas and, going forward, for children.

Mortality trends and length of stays among hospitalized patients with COVID-19 in Ontario and Québec (Canada): a population-based cohort study of the first three epidemic waves.

BACKGROUND: Epidemics of COVID-19 strained hospital resources. We describe temporal trends in mortality risk and length of stays in hospital and intensive care units (ICUs) among patients with COVID-19 hospitalized through the first three epidemic waves in Canada. METHODS: We used population-based provincial hospitalization data from the epicenters of Canada's epidemics (Ontario and Québec). Adjusted estimates were obtained using marginal standardization of logistic regression models, accounting for patient-level and hospital-level determinants. RESULTS: Using all hospitalizations from Ontario (N = 26,538) and Québec (N = 23,857), we found that unadjusted in-hospital mortality risks peaked at 31% in the first wave and was lowest at the end of the third wave at 6-7%. This general trend remained after adjustments. The odds of in-hospital mortality in the highest patient load quintile were 1.2-fold (95% CI: 1.0-1.4; Ontario) and 1.6-fold (95% CI: 1.3-1.9; Québec) that of the lowest quintile. Mean hospital and ICU length of stays decreased over time but ICU stays were consistently higher in Ontario than Québec. CONCLUSIONS: In-hospital mortality risks and length of ICU stays declined over time despite changing patient demographics. Continuous population-based monitoring of patient outcomes in an evolving epidemic is necessary for health system preparedness and response.

Time trends in social contacts of individuals according to comorbidity and vaccination status, before and during the COVID-19 pandemic.

BACKGROUND: As we are confronted with more transmissible/severe variants with immune escape and the waning of vaccine efficacy, it is particularly relevant to understand how the social contacts of individuals at greater risk of COVID-19 complications evolved over time. We described time trends in social contacts of individuals according to comorbidity and vaccination status before and during the first three waves of the COVID-19 pandemic in Quebec, Canada. METHODS: We used data from CONNECT, a repeated cross-sectional population-based survey of social contacts conducted before (2018/2019) and during the pandemic (April 2020 to July 2021). We recruited non-institutionalized adults from Quebec, Canada, by random digit dialling. We used a self-administered web-based questionnaire to measure the number of social contacts of participants (two-way conversation at a distance ≤2 m or a physical contact, irrespective of masking). We compared the mean number of contacts/day according to the comorbidity status of participants (pre-existing medical conditions with symptoms/medication in the past 12 months) and 1-dose vaccination status during the third wave. All analyses were performed using weighted generalized linear models with a Poisson distribution and robust variance. RESULTS: A total of 1441 and 5185 participants with and without comorbidities, respectively, were included in the analyses. Contacts significantly decreased from a mean of 6.1 (95%CI 4.9-7.3) before the pandemic to 3.2 (95%CI 2.5-3.9) during the first wave among individuals with comorbidities and from 8.1 (95%CI 7.3-9.0) to 2.7 (95%CI 2.2-3.2) among individuals without comorbidities. Individuals with comorbidities maintained fewer contacts than those without comorbidities in the second wave, with a significant difference before the Christmas 2020/2021 holidays (2.9 (95%CI 2.5-3.2) vs 3.9 (95%CI 3.5-4.3); P<0.001). During the third wave, contacts were similar for individuals with (4.1, 95%CI 3.4-4.7) and without comorbidities (4.5, 95%CI 4.1-4.9; P=0.27). This could be partly explained by individuals with comorbidities vaccinated with their first dose who increased their contacts to the level of those without comorbidities. CONCLUSIONS: It will be important to closely monitor COVID-19-related outcomes and social contacts by comorbidity and vaccination status to inform targeted or population-based interventions (e.g., booster doses of the vaccine).

Time trends in social contacts before and during the COVID-19 pandemic: the CONNECT study.

BACKGROUND: Since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, many countries, including Canada, have adopted unprecedented physical distancing measures such as closure of schools and non-essential businesses, and restrictions on gatherings and household visits. We described time trends in social contacts for the pre-pandemic and pandemic periods in Quebec, Canada. METHODS: CONNECT is a population-based study of social contacts conducted shortly before (2018/2019) and during the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020 - February 2021), using the same methodology for both periods. We recruited participants by random digit dialing and collected data by self-administered web-based questionnaires. Questionnaires documented socio-demographic characteristics and social contacts for two assigned days. A contact was defined as a two-way conversation at a distance ≤ 2 m or as a physical contact, irrespective of masking. We used weighted generalized linear models with a Poisson distribution and robust variance (taking possible overdispersion into account) to compare the mean number of social contacts over time and by socio-demographic characteristics. RESULTS: A total of 1291 and 5516 Quebecers completed the study before and during the pandemic, respectively. Contacts significantly decreased from a mean of 8 contacts/day prior to the pandemic to 3 contacts/day during the spring 2020 lockdown. Contacts remained lower than the pre-COVID period thereafter (lowest = 3 contacts/day during the Christmas 2020/2021 holidays, highest = 5 in September 2020). Contacts at work, during leisure activities/in other locations, and at home with visitors showed the greatest decreases since the beginning of the pandemic. All sociodemographic subgroups showed significant decreases of contacts since the beginning of the pandemic. The mixing matrices illustrated the impact of public health measures (e.g. school closure, gathering restrictions) with fewer contacts between children/teenagers and fewer contacts outside of the three main diagonals of contacts between same-age partners/siblings and between children and their parents. CONCLUSION: Physical distancing measures in Quebec significantly decreased social contacts, which most likely mitigated the spread of COVID-19.

Assessing fitness-for-purpose and comparing the suitability of COVID-19 multi-country models for local contexts and users: [version 1;peer review: 1 approved, 1 approved with reservations]

Background: Mathematical models have been used throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to inform policymaking decisions. The COVID-19 Multi-Model Comparison Collaboration (CMCC) was established to provide country governments, particularly low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), and other model users with an overview of the aims, capabilities and limits of the main multi-country COVID-19 models to optimise their usefulness in the COVID-19 response. Methods: Seven models were identified that satisfied the inclusion criteria for the model comparison and had creators that were willing to participate in this analysis. A questionnaire, extraction tables and interview structure were developed to be used for each model, these tools had the aim of capturing the model characteristics deemed of greatest importance based on discussions with the Policy Group. The questionnaires were first completed by the CMCC Technical group using publicly available information, before further clarification and verification was obtained during interviews with the model developers. The fitness-for-purpose flow chart for assessing the appropriateness for use of different COVID-19 models was developed jointly by the CMCC Technical Group and Policy Group. Results: A flow chart of key questions to assess the fitness-for-purpose of commonly used COVID-19 epidemiological models was developed, with focus placed on their use in LMICs. Furthermore, each model was summarised with a description of the main characteristics, as well as the level of engagement and expertise required to use or adapt these models to LMIC settings. Conclusions: This work formalises a process for engagement with models, which is often done on an ad-hoc basis, with recommendations for both policymakers and model developers and should improve modelling use in policy decision making.

Single-Dose Messenger RNA Vaccine Effectiveness Against Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 in Healthcare Workers Extending 16 Weeks Postvaccination: A Test-Negative Design From Québec, Canada.

BACKGROUND: In Canada, first and second doses of messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) were uniquely spaced 16 weeks apart. We estimated 1- and 2-dose mRNA vaccine effectiveness (VE) among healthcare workers (HCWs) in Québec, Canada, including protection against varying outcome severity, variants of concern (VOCs), and the stability of single-dose protection up to 16 weeks postvaccination. METHODS: A test-negative design compared vaccination among SARS-CoV-2 test-positive and weekly matched (10:1), randomly sampled, test-negative HCWs using linked surveillance and immunization databases. Vaccine status was defined by 1 dose ≥14 days or 2 doses ≥7 days before illness onset or specimen collection. Adjusted VE was estimated by conditional logistic regression. RESULTS: Primary analysis included 5316 cases and 53 160 controls. Single-dose VE was 70% (95% confidence interval [CI], 68%-73%) against SARS-CoV-2 infection; 73% (95% CI, 71%-75%) against illness; and 97% (95% CI, 92%-99%) against hospitalization. Two-dose VE was 86% (95% CI, 81%-90%) and 93% (95% CI, 89%-95%), respectively, with no hospitalizations. VE was higher for non-VOCs than VOCs (73% Alpha) among single-dose recipients but not 2-dose recipients. Across 16 weeks, no decline in single-dose VE was observed, with appropriate stratification based upon prioritized vaccination determined by higher vs lower likelihood of direct patient contact. CONCLUSIONS: One mRNA vaccine dose provided substantial and sustained protection to HCWs extending at least 4 months postvaccination. In circumstances of vaccine shortage, delaying the second dose may be a pertinent public health strategy.

Geographic concentration of SARS-CoV-2 cases by social determinants of health in metropolitan areas in Canada: a cross-sectional study.

BACKGROUND: Understanding inequalities in SARS-CoV-2 transmission associated with the social determinants of health could help the development of effective mitigation strategies that are responsive to local transmission dynamics. This study aims to quantify social determinants of geographic concentration of SARS-CoV-2 cases across 16 census metropolitan areas (hereafter, cities) in 4 Canadian provinces, British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec. METHODS: We used surveillance data on confirmed SARS-CoV-2 cases and census data for social determinants at the level of the dissemination area (DA). We calculated Gini coefficients to determine the overall geographic heterogeneity of confirmed cases of SARS-CoV-2 in each city, and calculated Gini covariance coefficients to determine each city's heterogeneity by each social determinant (income, education, housing density and proportions of visible minorities, recent immigrants and essential workers). We visualized heterogeneity using Lorenz (concentration) curves. RESULTS: We observed geographic concentration of SARS-CoV-2 cases in cities, as half of the cumulative cases were concentrated in DAs containing 21%-35% of their population, with the greatest geographic heterogeneity in Ontario cities (Gini coefficients 0.32-0.47), followed by British Columbia (0.23-0.36), Manitoba (0.32) and Quebec (0.28-0.37). Cases were disproportionately concentrated in areas with lower income and educational attainment, and in areas with a higher proportion of visible minorities, recent immigrants, high-density housing and essential workers. Although a consistent feature across cities was concentration by the proportion of visible minorities, the magnitude of concentration by social determinant varied across cities. INTERPRETATION: Geographic concentration of SARS-CoV-2 cases was observed in all of the included cities, but the pattern by social determinants varied. Geographically prioritized allocation of resources and services should be tailored to the local drivers of inequalities in transmission in response to the resurgence of SARS-CoV-2.

Dépistage actif chez les groupes courant un risque accru de contracter le SRAS-CoV-2 au Canada : coûts et ressources humaines nécessaires.

CONTEXTE: Le dépistage du coronavirus du syndrome respiratoire aigu sévère 2 (SRAS-CoV-2) est en grande partie passif, ce qui nuit au contrôle de l'épidémie. Nous avons élaboré des stratégies de dépistage actif du SRAS-CoV-2 au moyen d'une amplification en chaîne par polymérase couplée à une transcription inverse (RT-PCR) chez les groupes courant un risque accru de contracter le virus dans les provinces canadiennes. MÉTHODES: Nous avons identifié 5 groupes qui devraient être prioritaires pour le dépistage actif au moyen d'une RTPCR, soit les gens ayant été en contact avec une personne infectée par le SRAS-CoV-2 et ceux qui appartiennent à 4 populations à risque : employés d'hôpitaux, travailleurs en soins de santé communautaires ainsi qu'employés et résidents d'établissements de soins de longue durée, employés d'entreprises essentielles, et élèves et personnel scolaire. Nous avons estimé les coûts, les ressources humaines et la capacité de laboratoire nécessaires au dépistage des membres de ces groupes ou au dépistage sur des échantillons aléatoires aux fins de surveillance. RÉSULTATS: Du 8 au 17 juillet 2020, 41 751 dépistages par RT-PCR étaient réalisés chaque jour en moyenne dans les provinces canadiennes; nous avons estimé que ces tests mobilisaient 5122 employés et coûtaient 2,4 millions de dollars par jour (67,8 millions de dollars par mois). La recherche et le dépistage systématiques des contacts requerraient 1,2 fois plus de personnel et porteraient les coûts mensuels à 78,9 millions de dollars. S'il était réalisé en 1 mois, le dépistage de tous les employés des hôpitaux nécessiterait 1823 travailleurs supplémentaires et coûterait 29,0 millions de dollars. Pour la même période de temps, le dépistage de tous les travailleurs en soins de santé communautaires et de tous les employés et résidents des établissements de soins de longue durée nécessiterait 11 074 employés supplémentaires et coûterait 124,8 millions de dollars, et celui de tous les travailleurs essentiels nécessiterait 25 965 employés supplémentaires et coûterait 321,7 millions de dollars. Enfin, le dépistage sur 6 semaines de la population scolaire nécessiterait 46 368 employés supplémentaires et coûterait 816,0 millions de dollars. Les interventions visant à pallier les inefficacités, comme le dépistage à partir d'échantillons de salive et le regroupement des échantillons, pourraient réduire les coûts de 40 % et les besoins en personnel, de 20 %. Le dépistage de surveillance sur des échantillons de la population autre que les contacts coûterait 5 % des coûts associés à l'adoption d'une approche universelle de dépistage auprès des populations à risque. INTERPRÉTATION: Le dépistage actif des groupes courant un risque accru de contracter le SRAS-CoV-2 semble faisable et favoriserait la réouverture sûre et à grande échelle de l'économie et des écoles. Cette stratégie semble également abordable lorsque comparée aux 169,2 milliards de dollars versés par le gouvernement fédéral dans la lutte contre la pandémie en date de juin 2020.

The role of case importation in explaining differences in early SARS-CoV-2 transmission dynamics in Canada-A mathematical modeling study of surveillance data.

OBJECTIVE: The North American coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) epidemic exhibited distinct early trajectories. In Canada, Quebec had the highest COVID-19 burden and its earlier March school break, taking place two weeks before those in other provinces, could have shaped early transmission dynamics. METHODS: We combined a semi-mechanistic model of SARS-CoV-2 transmission with detailed surveillance data from Quebec and Ontario (initially accounting for 85% of Canadian cases) to explore the impact of case importation and timing of control measures on cumulative hospitalizations. RESULTS: A total of 1544 and 1150 cases among returning travelers were laboratory-confirmed in Quebec and Ontario, respectively (symptoms onset ≤03-25-2020). Hospitalizations could have been reduced by 55% (95% CrI: 51%-59%) if no cases had been imported after Quebec's March break. However, if Quebec had experienced Ontario's number of introductions, hospitalizations would have only been reduced by 12% (95% CrI: 8%-16%). Early public health measures mitigated the epidemic spread as a one-week delay could have resulted in twice as many hospitalizations (95% CrI: 1.7-2.1). CONCLUSION: Beyond introductions, factors such as public health preparedness, responses and capacity could play a role in explaining interprovincial differences. In a context where regions are considering lifting travel restrictions, coordinated strategies and proactive measures are to be considered.

Active testing of groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 in Canada: costs and human resource needs.

BACKGROUND: Testing for severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is largely passive, which impedes epidemic control. We defined active testing strategies for SARS-CoV-2 using reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) for groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 in all Canadian provinces. METHODS: We identified 5 groups who should be prioritized for active RT-PCR testing: contacts of people who are positive for SARS-CoV-2, and 4 at-risk populations - hospital employees, community health care workers and people in long-term care facilities, essential business employees, and schoolchildren and staff. We estimated costs, human resources and laboratory capacity required to test people in each group or to perform surveillance testing in random samples. RESULTS: During July 8-17, 2020, across all provinces in Canada, an average of 41 751 RT-PCR tests were performed daily; we estimated this required 5122 personnel and cost $2.4 million per day ($67.8 million per month). Systematic contact tracing and testing would increase personnel needs 1.2-fold and monthly costs to $78.9 million. Conducted over a month, testing all hospital employees would require 1823 additional personnel, costing $29.0 million; testing all community health care workers and persons in long-term care facilities would require 11 074 additional personnel and cost $124.8 million; and testing all essential employees would cost $321.7 million, requiring 25 965 added personnel. Testing the larger population within schools over 6 weeks would require 46 368 added personnel and cost $816.0 million. Interventions addressing inefficiencies, including saliva-based sampling and pooling samples, could reduce costs by 40% and personnel by 20%. Surveillance testing in population samples other than contacts would cost 5% of the cost of a universal approach to testing at-risk populations. INTERPRETATION: Active testing of groups at increased risk of acquiring SARS-CoV-2 appears feasible and would support the safe reopening of the economy and schools more broadly. This strategy also appears affordable compared with the $169.2 billion committed by the federal government as a response to the pandemic as of June 2020.